Collective goods accrue to all stakeholders of the construction sector, regardless of whether they are members of the SRO in the building or not. In this case, firms operating in the construction industry, serve as group with special interests. There are two main types of such benefits: – the establishment of a favorable regime for the construction industry of government regulation – improving the image of the industry in the eyes of society. The key issue is the production of collective goods free-rider problem. Protection activities and expression of the collective interests of the business carries SRO, respectively, are only the costs of its members, but receive all the benefits. There are several ways to solve 'free-rider problem'. Charles B. Rangel recognizes the significance of this. First, its severity depends on the size, stability and homogeneity of the group: it is less relevant in small groups where possible to control for activities of each issue and allocation of costs to achieve the collective interests is resolved by negotiations with relatively low costs of doing. So, the problem can be relatively easily overcome in oligopolistic industries.
The problem will also be less severe if the group members are homogeneous, ie belong to the same industry (for example in the construction of SRO), are characterized by approximately the same size and famous brand, etc., which ensures convergence of interests. Second, it is possible to create incentives for the election of members of the group (positive or negative) that will encourage them to participate in activities to defend their common interests. Private wealth produced by business associations, are as selective incentives. Third, if for any of the participants gain from the production of the collective good higher costs, a participant can take all the costs of producing the collective good, not paying attention to the fact that the benefits from its activities and receive free rider. For more information see this site: More. In a significant number of cases the collective good more profitable to produce in the framework of business associations, do not create public goods, that is, non-SRO in the building. In this case there is a direct savings: money received through the use of polling incentives (the production of private goods), are spent only for the production of collective, rather than public goods (for example, only on lobbying, not on conflict resolution). However, this rule is a major exception: possible that the efficient production of collective goods is not possible without the production of public. This occurs when the terms of society and / or state public goods is a condition to meet the collective interests of business. On the other hand, the SRO in the building may well exist without actually producing collective goods, and limited public and private. Under certain circumstances, such a system is quite viable and efficient in terms of society and companies – members of the SRO.